Liberal democracy is on the retreat worldwide: In March 2024, the Transformation Index published by the Bertelsmann Stiftung listed more countries with autocratic regimes than democratically governed states – for the first time since 2004. “Autocratic regimes such as Russia and, above all, China are also becoming increasingly self-confident in international politics and are trying to impose their ideas upon the international order,” says Monika Polzin, head of the WU Institute for the Internationalization of Law.

Polzin warns that illiberal and authoritarian tendencies might be introduced to parts of international law. In an article published in the renowned Nordic Journal of International Law, Polzin describes how the international community – first and foremost the world’s liberal democracies – can address these developments.

The rule of law replaced by the law of the jungle

In her paper entitled “The Global Illiberal Dawn,” Professor Polzin for the first time proposes a definition of authoritarian international law norms. “Today's autocratic rulers no longer openly declare that they want to abolish democracy and human rights,” Polzin explains. “Instead, they say: We want democracy, but we define it differently; we want human rights, but we interpret them differently.” To effectively counter these tendencies, the international community needs a precise definition of what constitutes authoritarian international law.

This new definition distinguishes between two categories: on the one hand, traditional international law, which essentially regulates relations between sovereign states, and on the other hand, international norms that relate directly to the domestic order within a country, such as human rights.

According to Monika Polzin, intergovernmental norms become authoritarian when they are based on arbitrary rules and the law of the strongest, following the principle of the “survival of the fittest.” Polzin says that subtle autocratic tendencies can currently be seen at play in this area, as evidenced by the resurgence of historical disputes, for example China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, which are based on historical rather than legal arguments.

Is leading a happy life a human right?

As far as the second category is concerned – i.e., norms that govern the domestic order within individual countries – Monika Polzin argues that the biggest danger is the current tendency to reinterpret human rights – an approach that is most prominently taken by China: In 2022, for example, Chinese President Xi Jinping caused a stir at a meeting with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights when he said that “leading a happy life” was the greatest human right. “Such statements may sound good at first,” explains Professor Polzin, “but you have to realize that not everything that sounds good is good.”

Viewed in a broader context, this statement would imply that a happy life, as defined by the state, is the ultimate right and takes precedence over fundamental liberal rights and even people’s social rights. “The vehicle for such a reinterpretation is the right to development. China has been trying for some time to inject its viewpoints into international law via non-binding documents,” says Monika Polzin. “The Western states must remain vigilant in this regard,” she warns.

For a glimpse of what authoritarian international law looks like, it is worth taking a look at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an international alliance that was founded in 2001 by China and Russia, among others. Currently, its members also include Iran, Pakistan, and (democratic) India. Within this group of countries, it is already possible to conclude international treaties for combatting terrorism, extremism, and separatism that make no reference to human rights at all. As Polzin argues, “This organization is a strategic alliance of interests directed against the West, and it’s a sandbox for authoritarian states to create international law where human rights protection plays no role whatsoever.”

The definitions put forth by Monika Polzin enable democratic states to identify these tendencies – and stand up against them in international bodies. “Today, democracies face the big challenge of defending freedom and justice in international law, partly also to protect their own national constitutions from attempts to undermine them,” says Professor Polzin.

Further information

Polzin, M. (2024). The Global Illiberal Dawn: Toward a Definition of ‘Authoritarian International Law Norms’. Nordic Journal of International Law, 93(2), 237-266.

Link to the study