Studierende entspannen sich in der Erholunsgzone vor dem D4 Gebäude über dem Brunnen.

Juni 2010

"Cau­sa­li­ty, Mo­da­li­ty, and Ob­jec­ti­vi­ty"

First Joint Workshop of the Philosophy Group, WU Wirtschaftsuniversität and the Vienna Forum for Analytic Philosophy:


Keynote Speaker:


Barry Stroud

Work­shop 14. - 15. 06. 2010

2.00 - 5.00



Location:


The workshop takes place at the WU Wien, Augasse 2 - 6, 1090 Vienna, (Room A 1.10.12, UZA I. First Floor) .

Barry Stroud: EN­GA­GE­MENT AND MA­TA­PHY­SI­CAL DIS­SA­TIS­FAC­TION: Mo­da­li­ty and Value.

We all have be­liefs to the ef­fect that if a cer­tain thing were to hap­pen a cer­tain other thing would hap­pen. We also be­lie­ve that some things sim­ply must be so, with no pos­si­bi­li­ty of ha­ving been other­wi­se. And in ac­ting in­ten­tio­nal­ly we all take cer­tain things to be good re­a­son to be­lie­ve or do cer­tain things. In this book Barry Stroud ar­gues that some be­liefs of each of these kinds are in­dis­pensable to our ha­ving any con­cep­ti­on of a world at all. That means no one could con­sistent­ly dis­miss all be­liefs of these kinds as me­re­ly ways of thin­king that do not de­scri­be how things re­al­ly are in the world as it is in­de­pendent­ly of us and our re­spon­ses. But the un­ac­cep­ta­bi­li­ty of any such ne­ga­ti­ve 'un­mas­king' view does not sup­port a sa­tis­fyin­gly po­si­ti­ve me­ta­phy­si­cal 'rea­lism'. No me­ta­phy­si­cal sa­tis­fac­tion is avail­able eit­her way, given the con­di­ti­ons of our hol­ding the be­liefs whose me­ta­phy­si­cal sta­tus we wish to un­der­stand. This does not mean we will stop as­king the me­ta­phy­si­cal ques­ti­on. But we need a bet­ter un­der­stan­ding of how it can have wha­te­ver sense it has for us. This chal­len­ging vo­lu­me takes up these large, fun­da­men­tal ques­ti­ons in clear lan­guage ac­ces­si­ble to a wide phi­lo­so­phi­cal rea­der­ship.

184 Sei­ten, Ox­ford Univ Pr, 1. Auf­la­ge (2011),
Eng­lisch

ISBN-​10: 0199764964
ISBN-​13: 978-​0199764969