Dockner Lectures

Im Gedenken an Prof. Engelbert Dockner begründen die Universität Wien, die Technische Universität Wien und die Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien die ”Dockner Lectures”.

Im April 2017 ist einer der renommiertesten österreichischen Ökonomen, Engelbert Dockner, nach langer schwerer Krankheit verstorben.

In seiner Dissertation hat Engelbert Dockner eine elegante Stabilitätsanalyse von Modellen zweistufiger optimaler Steuerung ökonomischer Prozesse hergeleitet. Ein weiterer wegweisender Beitrag war seine Arbeit in ”Differential Games in Economics and Management Science” (gemeinsam mit Jorgensen, Long und Sorger). Den größten Teil seiner Karriere war er Professor für Finanzen und arbeitete an verschiedenen Themen wie Asset Pricing, Risikodynamik und Finanzmarktstrukturen.



Vergangene Veranstaltungen

10. Mai 2022 - Cars Hommes (Universität Amsterdam)
"Complex Economic Dynamics" 

Abstract: This talk surveys some of Prof. Hommes' work on complex economic dynamics with adaptively learning agents in behavioral macro-finance models. The economy consists of boundedly rational agents who do not fully understand their complex environment and use simple decision heuristics. This leads to a complex nonlinear adaptive system with complex dynamics, where the economy may not settle down to the rational equilibrium, but rather agents may learn almost self-fulfilling equilibria with highly persistent expectations driven fluctuations.

10. April 2019 - Ngo Van Long
 (McGill University)
"International oligopoly with public investments in trade-facilitating infrastructure: a differential game "

Abstract: The first models of dynamic international oligopoly were developed by Engelbert Dockner and Alfred Haug in 1990 and 1991, using the partial equilibrium framework. The present paper proposes a general equilibrium setting, in which we consider a differential game between two governments that invest in transportation infrastructure in order to help their exporting oligopolists in terms of reduced transport costs. Each country has a set of oligopolistic firms some of which compete in the world market. Countries differ from each other in terms of population sizes and the number of differentiated products. We study the incentives for countries to build up (or not to build up) infrastructure capital and show how the patterns of trade evolve along the equilibrium path. The possibilities of multiple equilibria and Skiba points are explored. The paper sheds light on the roles of history and expectations in shaping the development of nations.